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The New Orleans Criminal Legal System: A Flowing River 
 
William C. Snowden 
 
No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the same river and he’s not the same man.  
—Heraclitus 
 
Ask anyone from New Orleans and they will tell you the city has not been the same since the 
storm. Although the city has persevered through many storms and hurricanes in its three-hundred-
year history, this particular storm—Hurricane Katrina—is notorious for the transformation it 
brought to New Orleans in the years that followed.  
The makeup, culture, and rhythm of New Orleans have changed, but so too have the various 
systems that give the city its tempo—particularly the criminal legal system. Hurricane Katrina was 
a disaster that revealed deficiencies, abnormalities, and injustices in the New Orleans criminal 
legal system. Some responses to these revelations were criticized and some were supported, and 
what we have today in 2020—fifteen years after the storm—is a city that is not the same.  
To understand the change in the city’s criminal legal system, we will start by looking at how 
the Vera Institute of Justice (Vera) came to work in New Orleans, then we will review Vera’s 
involvement in various efforts to reduce the jail size—in population and in structure. Finally, we 
will list some lessons learned since Vera began its work in New Orleans. 
 
Vera to New Orleans: The Backstory 
When New Orleans Council member James Carter called the president of Vera, Michael Jacobson, 
for help in 2006, the two had never met. In the aftermath of Katrina, Carter, newly elected to the 
city council, would soon make criminal justice his central issue.  
The tenor of New Orleans at the time was to rebuild various systems, including education, 
housing, and infrastructure, to pre-Katrina levels. As a defense attorney, Carter was familiar with 
the criminal legal system and its failings. He recognized the desperate need for New Orleans to 
avoid rebuilding the pre-Katrina system and began to reimagine what local justice could look like. 
Thus, along with his fellow councilmember Shelley Midura, he reached out to Vera for assistance.  
Vera is a nonprofit organization that drives change in justice systems to ensure fairness, 
promote safety, and strengthen communities. It was started in New York City in 1961 with a focus 
on demonstrating, through the Manhattan Bail Project, that New Yorkers who were too poor to 
afford bail but had significant ties to their communities could be released from jail and still make 
their court dates. Vera has evolved to address a multitude of issues in our criminal legal system. 
Today, Vera works in more than forty states, with its main office in New York City and other 
offices in Los Angeles, New Orleans, and Washington, DC. Vera works with local, state, and 
national government officials as well as community leaders to create change within the criminal 
legal system, employing a combination of research, data analysis, community engagement, 
technical assistance, and project management. 
Vera’s first task on arriving in New Orleans in 2006 was to assess the landscape and determine 
the steps New Orleans needed to take to develop a criminal legal system that was more just,  
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reliable, and effective. That assessment included interviews with members of the New Orleans 
City Council, Criminal District Court judges, the district attorney, the chief public defender, the 
sheriff, the chief of police, and other justice system leaders as well as nonprofit research and 
advocacy organizations. Vera also analyzed the available data on the system’s operation after the 
storm.  
This assessment produced Vera’s 2007 report “Proposals for New Orleans’ Criminal Justice 
System: Best Practices to Advance Public Safety and Justice.” This report identified areas that 
needed to be improved and made recommendations that were eventually adopted by the New 
Orleans City Council. The adoption of these recommendations demonstrated the city’s 
commitment to a well-functioning criminal legal system and signaled the flow of changes to come. 
Vera was adamant that the city lead this reform. And they did. With the guidance of Vera and 
support of a local philanthropic organization, Baptist Community Ministries, Carter organized a 
two-day retreat with all the city leaders to encourage them to commit to implementing the reforms 
the criminal legal system needed. At the end of the retreat, all of the leaders signed on in support 
of and commitment to the reforms. Later, the Criminal Justice Leadership Alliance came together 
to lead these reforms. The alliance comprised many of the same justice system leaders present at 
the retreat. 
Vera also made a commitment to the city by opening and staffing its own local office in New 
Orleans in 2008. Diverging from its typical approach to jurisdictional assistance, which involved 
making phone calls, sending e-mail messages, and flying in New York staff, Vera made New 
Orleans one of its homes and hired local New Orleanians. Having Vera staff physically present, 
and made up of people from New Orleans, was a vital way to maintain the energy and direction of 
the reform strategies and their implementations.  
 
An Oversized Jail 
In August 2005, the month Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, the average monthly jail population 
was recorded at more than sixty-five hundred inmates.1 It cannot be overstated how monumental 
this number is. Compared to nine other areas in the country, Orleans Parish—which is the same as 
the City of New Orleans—was an outlier (see Figure 1).2 




Figure 1. Ten most incarcerated US jurisdictions, 2005; jail incarceration rate per 1,000 residents 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Jail Inmates at Midyear 2007,” US Census Bureau, 2008) 
 
 
Orleans Parish (“parish” is used instead of “county” in Louisiana), for decades, consistently 
had incarceration rates significantly higher than those of other cities. The local jail, Orleans Parish 
Prison—so named though it was a jail, not a prison—unlike typical jails, housed more than just 
pretrial inmates. The system, however, which allowed the sheriff to be paid per inmate per day, 
provided a financial incentive to fill the jail. 
The inmate population comprised juveniles and adults and was made up of people with 
different categorizations and at different stages of their journey through the system. Among the 
inmates were those who were in felony pretrial or misdemeanor or traffic pretrial, those who were 
in custody for competency restoration, those charged with violating parole or probation, those held 
on local warrants or for other jurisdictions for extradition, those sentenced to Orleans Parish 
Prison, and state inmates sentenced to Department of Corrections time. The practice of housing 
state inmates in local jails is unique in Louisiana and was abundant in Orleans Parish.  
This variety of people in the jail was a main contributor to its bloated size. Because of reforms 
instituted over the past eleven years, the average monthly jail population has been reduced 
significantly. 
In the summer of 2019, fourteen years after the storm, New Orleans was averaging a monthly 
population of between eleven hundred and twelve hundred inmates. The jail is no longer the 
same—in size or structure. The population and size reduction was a product of many strategies, 
including the halting of plans to expand the jail size, the creation of the New Orleans Pretrial 
Services Program, and a growing movement for bail reform. These strategies are discussed in the 
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following sections, which highlight Vera’s involvement in a few of the many strategies to reduce 
the jail population. 
 
Jail-Bed Cap of 1,438 
One of the most significant strategies undertaken to reduce the jail population was to build a 
smaller, centralized jail to replace the ones destroyed by the storm. Before Katrina, the local jail 
was made up of twelve facilities spread out within a half-mile radius, each of which had inmates 
when Hurricane Katrina hit August 28, 2005. According to the sheriff’s self-reported numbers, the 
inmate population of 7,520 was divided as follows: Community Corrections Center (1,280 
inmates), Conchetta (408 inmates), Fisk School Work Release (200 inmates), House of Detention 
(825 inmates), Orleans Parish Prison (831 inmates), Rendon (200 inmates), South White St. 
Juvenile Facility (288 inmates), Templeman Phase 1 (840 inmates), Templeman Phase 2 (890 
inmates), Templeman Phase 3 (1,204 inmates), Templeman Phase 4 (234 inmates), and 
Templeman Phase 5 (320 inmates). Compared to national averages, the city’s average monthly jail 
population in 2005 should have been about 1,200 people. Instead, it was six times the average size 
it should have been the day the storm hit.  
As the city recovered during the first year after Katrina, makeshift jails were erected to house 
inmates temporarily until there was a developed plan for a new, more permanent structure. In 2010, 
the City Planning Commission reviewed a proposal that the Orleans Parish sheriff, Marlin 
Gusman, submitted to the New Orleans City Council to build a new jail complex that would house 
up to 5,832 people. According to the sheriff, this was the size needed to replace the facilities that 
were lost by the storm, though at the time the jail population was about 3,400.3 
Vera had different projections. After the sheriff’s report was made public, Vera helped bring 
together the Orleans Parish Prison Reform Coalition, the Workers Center for Racial Justice, the 
New Orleans Coalition on Open Governance, and other community groups to organize the 
community demand for the city to commit to a smaller and safer jail. 
As the sheriff’s proposal was nearing a vote in city council, Vera helped persuade Stacy Head, 
a council member, and Susan Guidry, chair of the City Council Criminal Justice Committee, to 
delay the vote. Vera and local criminal justice community organizations also informed the Mayor’s 
Office that New Orleans did not need or want a massive jail. 
With the vote on the sheriff’s proposal delayed, Mayor Mitch Landrieu assigned his first 
deputy mayor, Andy Kopplin, to review the proposal with a convening of the Criminal Justice 
Working Group. After meeting with Vera and other experts, as well as community leaders, this 
group concluded in its resolution: “If specific policy reforms are fully implemented, New Orleans 
would need approximately 1,485 beds to house local inmates by the year 2020.”4 On the 
recommendation of the Criminal Justice Working Group, the city council approved construction 
for only one of the sheriff’s proposed housing facilities with 1,438 beds. The council also called 
for the decommission or demolition of the other facilities. 
 
New Orleans Pretrial Services 
The issue of pretrial services comes right back to that same question: Who should be in jail? And 
who can safely be at home?  
—Judge Calvin Johnson (Ret.), Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, 2014  
When Vera did its 2007 assessment of the New Orleans criminal legal system, it immediately 
highlighted the absence of a pretrial services program.5 Without such a program, the judges were 
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not receiving the information they needed to help them determine the potential flight risk or risk 
to public safety of defendants brought before them during bail hearings. 
According to the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure §230.2, an accused person must be 
brought in front of a magistrate judge or commissioner within forty-eight hours of their arrest.6 
This hearing is called a first appearance. At the first appearance, the magistrate judge or 
commissioner will decide three things: whether or not probable cause exists for the person’s arrest, 
whether or not the person qualifies for a public defender, and what type of bail the person should 
receive. 
The outcome of the first appearance is critical to the person charged with a crime. Depending 
on the type of bail and one’s financial circumstances, the decision could mean the difference 
between sitting in jail and getting out and keeping one’s job, one’s apartment, custody of one’s 
children, and so on. At the time, New Orleans did not have a risk assessment process to assist the 
judges in determining who could be safely released from jail and who should be considered for 
detention. 
Vera developed and launched the first New Orleans Pretrial Services program for the city in 
April 2012, and it was fully implemented in 2013.7 The plan was for Vera to start, develop, and 
operate the program until it could be spun off to another nonprofit or government agency. New 
Orleans Pretrial Services (NOPTS) produced reports with scores correlating with risk levels to 
give the judges additional information to consider when deciding whether to detain or release a 
defendant. The scores were based largely on an individual’s criminal history, or lack of criminal 
history, and employment and residential stability.  
NOPTS helped recommend defendants, on the low-end of the risk spectrum, for their 
nonfinancial release (a recognizance bond). That, in turn, helped reduce the jail population. Unless 
one had a private attorney calling in a favor from a judge, being released on one’s own 
recognizance was almost unheard of before NOPTS and before the storm. Vera helped normalize 
this practice. 
When NOPTS was introduced, the judges of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court were 
pessimistic about it. Many judges dismissed the value such risk assessments could offer during 
their bail-setting hearings. Nonetheless, in March 2017, the city handed the program over to the 
Criminal District Court, with the oversight of the Supreme Court, and the court adopted it as its 
own. The risk assessment instrument now used by the court is the Public Safety Assessment 
process from the Laura and John Arnold Foundation. The transition to this instrument represents 
a significant change in the court and their desire to effectively contribute to reducing pretrial 
detention. 
 
Ending Financial Injustice 
Anyone who studies the criminal legal system in New Orleans will quickly recognize the 
significant weight money plays on the scales of justice. In 2017, Vera looked at the extraction of 
wealth from poor, often black and brown, communities in New Orleans through bail, fines, and 
fees and submitted a report titled “Past Due: Examining the Costs and Consequences of Charging 
for Justice in New Orleans.” This report found that in 2015 New Orleanians paid $4.7 million to 
bail bond agents, $1.7 million in bail bond fees to government agencies, and $3.8 million in 
conviction fines and fees.8 
When a money bail is set at a person’s first appearance, the person generally has two options: 
pay the full amount in cash to the court or pay a percentage to a bail bond agent. There are other 
forms of bond, but a majority of the types assigned in New Orleans are cash or commercial surety. 
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When the full amount of bail is paid in cash, the money is returned minus the assessed government 
fee. When a bail bond agent is used, the percentage paid is not returned. For example, according 
to the Vera report, on a $10,000 bond, a person would pay a New Orleans bond agent a 10 percent 
premium, or $1,000, plus a 3 percent fee, or $300, which gets passed on to the government, and a 
separate flat government fee of $44, for a total of $1,344. When the person pays $1,300, excluding 
the flat government fee, the person will not get any of that $1,300 refunded regardless of the 
outcome of the case. 
The 3 percent fee is divided among the government actors present in the courtroom. The court 
gets 1.8 percent, the district attorney gets 0.4 percent, the public defender gets 0.4 percent, and the 
sheriff gets 0.4 percent. The judge who sets the bail amount and receives a portion of the bail fee 
has a financial conflict of interest according to a 2018 decision by federal judge. 
Generally, the purpose of bail is to ensure public safety and to ensure that the person returns 
to court. Research demonstrates, however, that people actually do not need to put up money to 
ensure that they will come back to court or not get rearrested. In jurisdictions that do not use money 
bail, people released through nonfinancial means have similar rates of court appearance and of no 
new arrests as those who are released through money bail.9 
As cited in “Past Due” in 2017 and in a 2019 report discussed later, on any given day in New 
Orleans, three out of ten people were in jail not because they were a threat to public safety but 
because they were too poor to afford bail. This financial injustice happens at the start of a case, 
with money bail, and it occurs also at the end of the case, with fines and fees. A majority of the 
New Orleanians sentenced in 2015 were ordered to pay fines and fees totaling $3.8 million. 
The “Past Due” report helped expose the inequitable ways money was being injected into the 
criminal legal system. Advocates seized on these findings and brought two successful lawsuits 
against the Orleans Parish courts, both decided in 2018.  
In the first of these, Caliste v. Cantrell, the federal court ruled it was unconstitutional to detain 
a person on money bail without determining their ability to pay, and that it was a conflict of interest 
for the local court to make a bail amount determination when they benefit financially from fees on 
bail bonds.10 In the other case, Cain v. City of New Orleans, a federal court ruled that it is 
unconstitutional to incarcerate a person because of their inability to pay fines and fees and that it 
is a conflict of interest for the courts to be the one determining the same person’s ability to pay.11  
Vera is often able to position itself to collect and report on data revealing injustices within the 
criminal legal system. Although we do not bring litigation ourselves, we often are in spaces where 
our findings help lay the framework for lawsuits, as we did in the Cain and Caliste cases. 
According to the lawsuits, the judges no longer can rely on the revenue generated from bail 
fees or conviction fees. The city provided the judges with funds to fill the gap created by the 
lawsuits in 2018 and gave them a full budget for the subsequent fiscal year. Following these lawsuit 
decisions, the city is in a unique moment to replace the money bail system with one that does not 
include money as part of the calculus to determine whether someone is detained or released. Such 
a determination should be based on an assessment of a person’s potential threat, or lack of a threat, 
to public safety. 
Seizing the moment created by the federal lawsuit decisions, Vera came out with a report in 
June 2019, “Paid in Full: Ending Money Injustice in New Orleans,” which includes a host of 
recommendations. If the twelve recommendations are adopted, the jail population could see a 
reduction of between approximately 304 and 687 people.12  
Money bail does not keep us safe. “Paid in Full” advocates for the replacement of money bail 
with a decision-making framework anchored in public safety. It also argues for the elimination of 
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conviction fees. Since the court has been fully funded by the city, it no longer needs to rely on the 
revenue previously generated by money bail and conviction fees. 
The lawsuits and the report will not automatically change the behavior of the judges. But the 
report does give advocates, nonprofit organizations, and community members a blueprint laying 
out the necessary changes the judges need to make. Vera will continue to work with the judges, 
the community, and city leaders to replace money bail and end conviction fees with a more 
equitable and safety-promoting system. 
 
Lessons Learned 
The people of New Orleans were very protective of their city after Hurricane Katrina. Its greatness 
had been rocked by a devastating storm leaving its infrastructure fractured, its residents displaced, 
and its future uncertain. New Orleans is a true treasure in the United States with a rich sense of 
history and pride. When national organizations, such as Vera, offered services during the recovery, 
they were not always immediately welcomed by the community.  
Some of the pushback Vera experienced was due to the way the organization was rocking a 
boat floating on self-interest. In New Orleans, for-profit systems were used to being the sole 
beneficiary of government contracts. Because Vera is a nonprofit organization, it was perceived 
as a threat to these business opportunities, particularly with the creation of the NOPTS program. 
At a city council meeting in 2012, many members of the community came out in support of 
NOPTS. Others, however, spoke out against it and resisted Vera’s work in New Orleans.13  
Resistance rooted in entrenched interests is often difficult to overcome. The lesson learned in 
New Orleans is that the way to overcome this resistance is through maximizing engagement with 
a variety of long-standing community organizations and government leaders. Many community 
organizations got behind Vera and its plans and recommendations, as did strong government 
leaders on the city council, such as Stacey Head and Susan Guidry, and in the Mayor’s Office, 
such as Andy Kopplin, who drove the transformation envisioned for the New Orleans criminal 
legal system with Vera’s assistance.  
In the years since that particular city council meeting, Vera has built its reputation with the 
New Orleans community as a trusted expert in the space of reform in the criminal legal system. 
Thirty-two local community organizations signed on endorsing and supporting the 
recommendations of the 2019 report “Paid in Full” to end financial injustice in New Orleans. This 
trust was built slowly, the product of meetings, partnerships, and recognition that justice reform is 
a collaborative process and that Vera had an important role to play in that movement. 
 
Conclusion 
In August 2005, other cities’ jail populations were dwarfed in comparison to New Orleans’. The 
unconscionable size of the jail population in the city was a symptom of a cancer of injustice that 
had spread throughout the criminal legal system. Hurricane Katrina revealed many of these 
injustices.  
The city rightly takes pride in the way it has significantly reduced its jail population. But 
despite this reduction, the racial disparities are nearly the same today as they were before Katrina. 
The population of New Orleans is about 60 percent black, 30 percent white, 5 percent Latinx, and 
3 percent Asian, yet black males, on average, make up 80 percent of the jail population.14 This 
figure highlights work that still needs to be done. 
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New Orleans is not the same as it was when Vera arrived in 2006. The mayor has changed, the 
city council has changed, and the justice issues have changed. Vera is proud of the way we have 
been able to contribute to its transformation by envisioning a society that respects the dignity of 
every person and safeguards justice for all New Orleanians. 
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